SCHOTT, RICHARD SIMPSON

Name: Richard Simpson Schott
Rank/Branch: O5/US Army
Unit: Advisor, Advisory Team 70, MACV
Date of Birth: 24 November 1929 (Brooklyn NY)
Home City of Record: St. Croix, Virgin Islands
Date of Loss: 07 April 1972
Country of Loss: South Vietnam
Loss Coordinates: 114946N 1063520E (XU731081)
Status (in 1973): Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered
Category: 1
Acft/Vehicle/Ground: Ground
Refno: 1819

Source: Compiled from one or more of the following: raw data from U.S.
Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families,
published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK in 1998.

Other Personnel In Incident: Howard B. Lull (missing); Mark A. Smith;
Kenneth Wallingford; Albert E. Carlson (all POWs held in Cambodia and
released in 1973)

REMARKS: KILLED IN BUNKER AT X0731081

SYNOPSIS: On April 5, 1972, the 5th North Vietnamese Division suddenly
smashed against the Loc Ninh district capitol before dawn, attacking as no
enemy had yet attacked in that war. The Communist troops had Russian T-54
and PT-76 tanks, artillery and a conventional battle plan.

American forces in the area battled for two days before being overrun. On
April 7, 1972, Maj. Albert E. Carlson; MSgt. Howard B. Lull; LtCol. Richard
Schott; Capt. Mark A. Smith; and SFC Kenneth Wallingford were five advisors
on Advisory Team 70, MACV, at Loc Ninh when the city was completely overrun.
Radio contact was maintained until approximately 0800 hours, when the
tactical operations center began burning. Later in the day, one of the
advisors radioed that they were going into hiding, taking their radios with
them.

After the incident, South Vietnamese Army personnel reported intercepting an
enemy radio broadcast which stated that three United States advisors had
been captured. Subsequent information received through intelligence sources
reported that five Americans were taken prisoner. This report indicated that
four of the prisoners had been taken to a temporary PW camp and one to an
enemy hospital.

The Vietnamese captured Smith, Wallingford and Carlson whom they held in
Cambodia for the remaining 10 months. On June 28, 1972, the U.S. Casualty
division changed their status from missing to captured. The three were
released at Loc Ninh in the general POW release in 1973.

Although most details of this incident are still classified, Capt. Smith
indicated in his debriefing that he, Lull and Schott had been together in a
bunker shortly before he was captured. Lull left the bunker to evade
capture, while the severely wounded Schott knew he would not survive, and
lifted his own weapon to his head and shot himself to give the others a
chance to escape.

Lull, if captured, was not taken to the same prison camps as were Smith,
Carlson and Wallingford. Some reports say that he was killed by the North
Vietnamese, but the U.S. continued his status as Missing In Action pending
verification of death. Schott was carried as Missing until Capt. Smith's
debrief, at which time his status was changed to Killed in Action.

Since his return, Mark Smith has had a growing concern about Americans left
behind in Southeast Asia. Smith remained in the Army Special Forces, and
ultimately was promoted to the rank of major. In 1985, Smith and SFC Melvin
McIntyre brought suit against the U.S. Government for failing to comply with
U.S. law in securing the freedom of American POWs in Southeast Asia. The two
had been on a special assignment in Thailand, and had gathered substantial
evidence that American POWs were still being held. Further, Smith and
McIntyre claimed that this information, passed on to higher authority, had
been "deep-sixed" and there had been no attempt or intent to act upon it.

Mark Smith, like many close to the POW/MIA issue, feels that his government
has let the men down who proudly served their country. A patriot still,
Smith has spent the years since filing the lawsuit in Thailand, in further
attempts to secure the freedom of men who were left behind.


------------------------------------------------------------
EGRESS" Body mutilated by enemy after suicide - own 45 pistol

[ssrep7.txt 02/09/93]

SMITH 324 COMPELLING CASES

South Vietnam Howard B. Lull
Richard S. Schott
(1819)

On April 7, 1972, Sergeant First Class Lull was one of seven
Americans from Advisory Team 47 and one French national present at
An Loc City, Binh Long Province, when forces of the South
Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, were
attacked and overrun by tank led forces of the Vietnam People's
Army. Both Sergeant Lull and Colonel Schott were initially
reported missing in action. The French national with the Americans
was released shortly after capture. He was able to confirm
captivity of those Americans with him but was unable to establish
the fate of Sergeant Lull and Lt. Colonel Schott.

Returning U.S. POWs repatriated in February 1973 reported that
Lieutenant Colonel Schott was last seen on April 7th and in
circumstances where he appeared to be dead. Sergeant First Class
Lull was believed captured on April 8th.

In February 1973, a member of the South Vietnamese Army captured on
April 9th and repatriated in February 1973 reported that Sergeant
Lull evaded capture and reached a South Vietnamese Army post
approximately 13 kilometers to the south of where his team was
overrun. There he was reportedly killed in a Viet Cong ambush.
The former commander of the South Vietnamese Army's 9th Infantry
Regiment stated that both Colonel Schott and Sergeant Lull died in
their bunker.

In December 1988, U.S. intelligence personnel interviewed two
former South Vietnamese Army personnel who participated in the
lifting of the siege of An Loc. They described having been present
when An Loc was retaken and the bodies of those killed were
collected and buried in a mass grave. They stated that the bodies
included the partially decomposed bodies of two Americans, a
Lieutenant Colonel and a non-commissioned officer, possibly a
Sergeant First Class.

During the post hostilities review of the cases of those carried as
missing in action, Sergeant Lull and Colonel Schott were declared
dead/body not recovered. Neither individual was seen alive in
captivity by other U.S. POWs captured at An Loc.


-----------------------------------------------------------
[locninh.95 04/01/95]

AFTER ACTION REPORT THE BATTLE OF LOC NINH
4 - 7 APRIL 1972

SUBMITTED BY:

MARK A. SMITH, MAJOR, USA (RET)
GROUND COMMANDER, BATTLE OF LOC NINH


INTRODUCTION

I have read a number of reports concerning the battle of Loc Ninh. The
one most professionally disturbing is the one rendered by Major U. C.
Collins while a student in the USA Command and General Staff
College. One of the material sources from which he gathered
information was Major Albert E. Carlson, currently Colonel Albert E.
Carlson, Artillery. At the time of the Loc Ninh battle, Major
Carlson was the Deputy Regimental Staff Advisor to the 9th ARVN
Regiment. During the course of the battle, he was on the inner
perimeter; not on the outer perimeter or in the Regimental Tactical
Operations .Center (TOC). The important point is that, as an
Artillery officer, Major Carlson was assigned to the inner
perimeter and ordered to stay there prepared to offer advice to
the tactical commander concerning fire support planning. Also to be
noted is that as an Artillery officer and staff advisor to the ARVN,
this is the job in which he had been trained. Sergeant Kenneth
Wallingford was also assigned to the inner perimeter to assist
Major Carlson. These men did not have access to the command group
during this battle. Additionally, their capability to communicate was
limited to one PRC-77 radio adjusted to only the assigned advisor
frequency.

In regard to the tactical disposition of friendly and enemy forces, as
related in Major Collins' report, they are based upon pure supposition by
Major Carlson and are a complete fantasy. As I recall, a majority of the
events, as described in the report, either did not happen or did not
occur as described. Perhaps they are the opinion of Ed Carlson and the
5th DCAT after action report "writers" They could also be the
opinion of some Washington based Vietnamese Generals. The opinions
provided by these sources, however, are wrong; and have no basis in fact.

I was the ground commander of all ARVN and U.S. forces during
the battle of Loc Ninh. I wrote the attached report from that point of
view. Within minutes of the on-set of the battle of Loc Ninh,
command of all defending forces was passed to me by Lieutenant Colonel
Richard Schott. I retained this command authority for the duration of
the battle; and, in fact, throughout the subsequent period of
imprisonment in Cambodia.

From almost the opening moments of the battle, Colonel Vinh, 9th ARVN
Regimental Commander, did not command. Thirty five minutes into the
battle, I superceeded his authority and relieved him of command for the
reasons noted in the attached report. His staff then served under my
command during the entire fight. LTC Richard Schott placed me in command
and then protected me from all personnel who attempted to interfere.
LTC Schott's deferment of command to me was communicated to MG James
Hollingsworth and BG John McGiffert. They agreed with LTC Schott's
decision. This command situation was further communicated by me to General
Hung, Commander, ARVN 5th Division. LTC Schott's decision to put me in
command was made in deference to my experience in combat. I had
participated in major battles at Loc Ninh in 1966 and 1967.
Further, my ability to use the various supporting arms was
established. I had served in Vietnam, for at least a portion of
every year, from 1965 - 1972; and, finally, I was the only U.S.
soldier, on the ground at Loc Ninh, who was fluent in the
Vietnamese language.

The attached report describes the true disposition of friendly
forces, not where some commanders claimed them to be, and the true
disposition of enemy forces, not where they were "assumed" to be.
The report also correctly reflects an organization of 4 rifle
companies per battalion which was the standard rifle company
organization in the 9th Infantry Regiment.

I have written the attached report to set the record straight.
I regret that The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) chose to
classify my initial report, which I rendered while in Letterman Army
Medical Center in early 1973. Classification. of my initial report, I
have been told, was required because of sensitivity regarding the
manner in which LTC Schott was killed; and the actions of SFC Howard Lull.
The U.S. Army's uneasiness concerning the content of my initial
report was further compounded by my pointed statements concerning
Major Davidson, the acting Loc Ninh District Senior Advisor, and his
Vietnamese counterpart. These two men escaped from Loc Ninh and
Major Davidson was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross; the award being presented prior to myself and Captain George
Wanat being released from the POW camp. Subsequent to our release,
however, my comments in regard to Major Davidson were that he "whined"
throughout the entire battle; and finally deserted Captain George
Wanat while under fire. My DIA debriefers and the U.S. Army ignored
my comments because the Army would be embarrassed if it admitted a
"deserter" had received the Distinguished Service Cross for heroism during a
battle where he ran away. I could not professionally ignore Major
Davidson's conduct and actions during the battle and refused to retract the
truth. As a result, my initial report remains classified or has ceased to
exist. At my insistence, the Army accepted my submission of a
recommendation for award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Captain
George Wanat for his actions at Loc Ninh and for his thirty one days of
escape and evasion (E&E) prior to being captured by the Vietnamese.
George was, most deservingly, awarded the DSC.

In Annex D to this report is a description of the events in the prisoner
of war (POW) camp in Cambodia. Once again, as with my initial Loc
Ninh after action report, the DIA chose to classify my debriefing
concerning the period of imprisonment. The DIA did so because of my
strong statements concerning "who did what" and "who did not do as
duty and honor would dictate" while held as a POW.

The end-notes referenced in this report are located immediately
after "The Battle" section of the report. At Annex B, is a roster
that reflects names and/or call signs of participants. If anyone was
omitted from the report or was not given proper credit it is
unintentional. As to the question: Who was in command? I was in command!
My call sign, and nickname, is "Zippo"; my call sign was the prefix all
call signs of personnel assigned to the 9th RCAT. Annex C reflects the
names of eleven Americans, not counting myself, and one Frenchman. I
believe ten of these people are still living. I further believe at
least eight of them will verify that I commanded the defending forces
during the battle of Loc Ninh.


PRELUDE TO BATTLE:

During the winter of 1971-72, the 5th ARVN Division conducted
operations of a limited nature in Bing Long, Phouc Long, and Bing
Doung provinces. These operations rarely made contact with the
enemy, except for limited incursions into Cambodia toward the town
of Snoul. It should be noted that, within the 9th ARVN Regiment,
contacts with the enemy increased when advisors again accompanied
battalions on operation. This practice was reinstituted by myself in
November 1971. SFC Lull and myself accompanied battalions on
operations on a regular basis. One small battle between Lai Khe
and Ben Cat was initiated by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, in
December 1971. The area had been worked by numerous units without advisors.
By pushing the ARVN commander to move farther off the highway,
contact with a company of NVA was achieved. This indicated to LTC Schott,
Colonel Bill Miller, and to me that all was not as pacified as the
5th ARVN Division staff would have us believe.

Contacts around Loc Ninh were rare, as the enemy could see you
coming for a very long distance. Members of the Border Ranger
Battalion and the French plantation manager, however, assured me
that the NVA were in the area continuously. The Frenchman also
told me that he paid the NVA not to start trouble in the plantation.
This was done to preclude damage to the trees. The 9th Regiment
soon learned that by operating only within the confines of the
rubber plantation, one could avoid trouble.

One operation conducted northwest of Loc Ninh was to put a "scissor"
bridge in place on a small river at the border. The reason given was to
allow units to avoid using QL13 as the single avenue of approach to
Cambodia. My observation was that the bridge offered an excellent
avenue of approach for the enemy. The ARVN, however, left the bridge
in place and never guarded it or used it for operations because of its
size and location, in the jungle. The NVA made fine use of this bridge,
and one other, to put the 5th NVA Division in place for battle; and, the
9th Division used it to by-pass Loc Ninh for points South. During
the battle of Loc Ninh it took one full day to destroy this
bridge.

A short time prior to the battle, LTC Schott and myself drove
to Fire Support Base (FSB) Alpha. 'At the Montagnard village,
short of Fire Base Alpha, is a river. The bridge there had long since
been destroyed; however, "someone" had been building an underwater
bridge with rocks. Inquiries to the Rangers and to the 9th
Regiment Headquarters drew a negative response on knowledge of this
endeavor. A stop at the village and a discussion with some children
made it clear that "someone" had ordered the people to bring rocks to
build this structure. Further questioning about "who" only solicited
the response: "The Vietnamese." When asked if it was the ARVN or the
enemy, the response was that all Vietnamese were the enemy. When LTC
Schott and I raised the issue with Colonel Vinh, he was not
worried. Me was sure the Montagnards were using the underwater
bridge to smuggle wood from Cambodia. This structure held no
tactical implications for Colonel Vinh. He further stated that it was
good for the "scissor" bridge to remain in place as it gave the
NVA the opportunity to by pass Loc Ninh. He also said that if the NVA
came with full combat power, using the tanks and armored personnel carriers
(APC), captured in an earlier battle, we would have to surrender. He also
stated that he had been a prisoner in the 1950's and it was better than
being dead.

I made up my mind to two things at this time: (1) Loc Ninh would not
surrender without a fight; (2) The bridges would become prime targets at
the onset of any battle. With this in mind, the stage was set for the
battle of Loc Ninh.

On 30 March 1972 the Stars and Stripes published a picture of NVA
T-54 tanks on the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" headed South. Colonel Vinh,
however, remained convinced that the only armor the 9th ARVN Regiment
faced was captured M-41 tanks and APCs. An inventory of high
explosive anti tank (HEAT) ammunition, for the sole 106mm Recoilless
Rifle at Loc Ninh, showed the presence of precisely six rounds
on-hand! There were also fifty rounds of canister ammunition on-hand.
Colonel Vinh assured me he would request more ammunition. On the
afternoon of 4 April 1972 Major Carlson, SOT Wallingford, a French
photographer named Michael Dummond, and myself journeyed from Lai Khe
to An Loc. We were passed by numerous overloaded vehicles fleeing south.
Just south of Loc Ninh the French plantation manager passed us and waved for
us to go back. We proceeded on to Loc Ninh. The village square was
basically deserted, except for some drunk ARVN soldiers at the local
"soup stand". They said they were drunk because tomorrow they
would die. Colonel Vinh was not alone in his defeatism.
Amazingly the National Police station was erecting additional barbed
wire and filling sandbags. This for a staff of six people! These
personnel included one female and five male police. When I
inquired of Major Davidson as to the district chief's plans for
the police, he stated that they had been ordered to defend the police
station.

Other after action reports state that the 1st ARVN Cavalry was
operating in Cambodia just prior to the battle. This is a myth
concocted by Vinh and the Commander of the 1st ARVN Cavalry. They were, in
fact, at FSB Alpha. The only exception to this was a total of five APCs
and one tank at the intersection of QLIS and QL14. These vehicles were
placed here for two reasons: (1) To provide a blocking force to protect
the flank of the 1ST Cavalry Regiment moving to Loc Ninh; (2) to assist
or reinforce the 1ST Battalion, 9th infantry, at Bo Dop. The small size
of this force indicates the lack of tactical awareness of the 9th Infantry
and 1st Cavalry Regimental Commanders; because if is not tactically
sound to appose a force of two NVA regiments with an ARVN force of only five
APCs and one tank. Colonel Bill Miller, SRA 5th DCAT and myself both
attempted to convince Colonel Vinh and General Hung to pull the 1ST
Cavalry back to Loc Ninh. Colonel Vinh's thinking was that the NVA
would attack FSB Alpha and leave Loc Ninh alone. Also this was
his reasoning to move the two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 9th
Infantry, not to the west of Loc Ninh as previously reported, but to place
=hem on the first hill mass south of Loc Ninh to cover a
withdrawal by the 9th Regiment. This movement was ordered
immediately after the departure of General Hung and Colonel Miller
from Loc Ninh. There was a contact to the west of Loc Ninh on the
afternoon of 4 April. It was actually made by the 9th Regiment
Reconnaissance (Recon) Company but it was reported as a contact made by the
3rd Battalion because Colonel Vinh had told General Hung that the 3rd
Battalion remained to the west. After this contact, all that remained
of the Recon Company was one wounded soldier with a radio. He
remained on the radio until the afternoon of 6 April and provided me with
targets to the west of Loc Ninh.

When I returned from An Loc, late in the afternoon of 4
April, I advised Colonel Vinh to move the 2nd Battalion, 9th
Infantry, except for one company, back to Loc Ninh from Fire
Support Base Alpha. I also advised him to leave a PF Platoon and RF
Company at the Cam Le bridge to assure it's destruction. Again,
Colonel Vinh stated that we could "survive" if we provided the enemy a
variety of targets. Also he felt that ordering the destruction of the
bridge would anger not only General Hung, but also the NVA Commander!
Colonel Vinh's theory was that, "when we surrender", we could bring up
certain things to show we actually helped the enemy. The term "when we
surrender" became more and more common in Colonel Vinh's discussions,
until he did in fact try to surrender Loc Ninh on 7 April 1972.

A contact was made by the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, South of Loc
Ninh on the evening of 4 April 1972. A five man squad of NVA was ambushed
and two were captured. At approximately 0200 hours, according to the
9th Regiment S2, these two stated that they were from the 272nd
Regiment, 9th NVA Division. They further stated that the rest of thee
division was passing Loc Ninh to attack An Loc. Their regiment was to
provide a blocking force to the south while the 5th NVA Division made the
main attack on Loc Ninh with Soviet Armor.

When I learned this at 0300 hours, I carried the E-6 Regiment
west of Loc Ninh on the situation map and added the 272nd Regiment
to the south and the remainder of the 5th NVA Division as the
attacking force.

The events described above and the resulting disposition of friendly and
enemy forces, as depicted on my map as of 0300 hours, 5 April
1972, set the stage for the battle of Loc Ninh. As the battle
scenario develops, it will become evident why I continued to place
the 272nd Regiment of the 9th NVA Division south of Loc Ninh.


THE BATTLE

The battle of Loc Ninh began during the afternoon of 4 April 1972 when
the Recon Company, 9th ARVN Regiment, was destroyed by what was believed
to be elements of the NVA E-6 Regiment West of Loc Ninh. A lone surviving
soldier, with a radio, reported tanks and infantry in large numbers
moving toward Loc Ninh and the South.

At 0300 hours, 5 April, a rocket attack on Loc Ninh was
initiated by the NVA. At this point Colonel Vinh became concerned
about Loc Ninh itself. He informed LTC Schott and myself that now
he would order the 1ST Cavalry Regiment back to Loc Ninh. We told him in no
uncertain terms that it was too late. Besides, FSB Alpha had an
anti-tank ditch and four tubes of artillery. Colonel Vinh
disregarded this advice and ordered the Rangers, 2/9 Rifle Companies and
the 1ST Cavalry at FSB Alpha to return to Loc Ninh. The five APCs
and one tank at the intersection of QL13 and QL14 were to "cover the
withdrawal."

At 0335 hours, the Commander of the let Calvary informed
Colonel Vinh he was surrendering. Vinh said he understood! As a result
of Vinh's action, it became clear to me that he did not intend to fight
the NVA and I told Vinh he no longer commanded anything. The regimental
staff, with the exception of the regimental XO, backed me. LTC Schott
also backed me. As of that moment, and for the rest of the battle of Loc
Ninh, I commanded the 9th ARVN Regiment.

I immediately contacted the commander of the 1ST ARVN Cavalry
Regiment and told him I would "air strike" him if he surrendered
without a fight. He stated that they would try. Ten minutes later the
Rangers and 2-/9 contacted me and said they were attempting to fight on
to Loc Ninh; but, the 1ST Cavalry had surrendered and was moving West
with the NVA.

I contacted the United States Air Force (USAF) Forward Air Controller
(FAC) and requested air strikes on all personnel and vehicles moving toward
the west and into Cambodia (Note 1). A Spectre Gunship reported
attacking armored vehicles moving west, five kilometers from QL13.

The Rangers and 2/9 made contact with the five APCs and one tank from
the 1ST Cavalry at the intersection of QL13 and QL14. As many personnel as
possible mounted the vehicles and they tried to break through to Loc Ninh.
I requested that "Spectre"" try to cover their withdrawal. This is the
unit that was ambushed just north of Loc Ninh. The Rangers reported an
ambush one kilometer long. I ordered them to light through the ambush and
ordered air strikes in support. The Rangers reported that Colonel Vinh
had ordered them back to FSB Alpha. It was at this point that we
noticed Colonel Vinh on another radio. We disconnected Vinh's handle
- and told the staff to keep him off the radio to subordinate
units. Vinh was told that if he wanted to do something, talk to
5th Division and tell them what was happening.

As the battle began to develop, the sensor operator from 5th Division
began to bang on the side of his console. All the little black
buttons on his console had turned white. I knew nothing about
sensors; but I asked him if this real function had ever happened
before. He stated that animals would sometimes cause an individual
sensor to activate but that he had never before observed all sensors
activated at one time. I asked him for the sensor locations. He
said only 5th Division knew the locations. I then asked Colonel
Vinh and later General Hung about these locations. I was unable
to obtain a satisfactory answer. I finally asked the "Sundog" FAC to
contact 5th Division and Corps for the positions of the sensor fields and
then for him to bomb them. He said, "which one?" I took another look at
the sensor console and said, "all of them." What was done about this
request I don't know; the sensor console ceased to operate after our TOC
received a hit that morning from a 75mm Recoilless Rifle round.

The volume of fire into Loc Ninh increased over the next two days. The
vast majority of the fire was rockets and tube artillery, with some
mortar rounds. The tube artillery was from three locations: (1) Four
tubes of 105mm, captured from the 1ST Cavalry Regiment; (2) 105mm and
155mm firing from the south, probably captured at Hung Tam on 6
April; (3) fire coming from the north and northwest. The artillery
from this third source was fired from a great distance and I believe
it was 130mm gun rounds rather than the 155mm previously reported. I
spoke to an advisor (Note 2) at Hung Tam by radio and he assured me that
his counterpart had "spiked the tubes" prior to their attempting to pullout.
On 6 April, however, the Company Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th
Infantry, at Cam Le bridge informed me that the guns from Hung Tam were
firing on Loc Ninh. I ordered an air strike on Hung Tam at
approximately 1900 hours, 6 April. General Hung, however, canceled my
order as he still believed the guns were in the hands of the 52nd
Regiment. By evening of the same day the guns had disappeared to the west.
Earlier, on the morning of-5 April, direct fire weapons had commenced
firing into Loc Ninh from across the airstrip to the east. One round
from a 75mm recoilless rifle struck the 9th Regiment TOC directly in front
of the command radio. Both LTC Schott and I were wounded in the head
and neck (Note 3). Major Carlson, Sergeant Wallingford, and Michael
Dummond came through the fire and patched us up as best they could.

Major Carlson, in the mean time, attempted to direct the air campaign.
MG James Hollingsworth, however, demanded to know why "Zippo" was not
using all of the air support he had provided. I got back on the radio and
informed MG Hollingsworth that he would have to wait until I got the
holes in my head patched up. He apologized to me and in ten
minutes I was back on the radio. Major Carlson, SGT Wallingford, and
Michael Dummond returned to the inner perimeter. I never saw Major Carlson
again during the battle. At approximately 1000 hours, 5 April, a
platoon (two) tanks pulled into the tree line to the west of Loc Ninh. I
took a portable radio, LTC Schott, and SFC Lull and headed for
the perimeter just outside of our bunker.

When we reached the bunker with the single 106mm RR on it, SFC Lull
was no longer with us. We climbed to the top of the bunker and
engaged the tanks with the 106mm RR. This, I believe, is the tank that
has been described in various after action reports as being
destroyed by direct fire artillery. Infantry engaged us on the bunker
and I was wounded again (Note 3). LTC Schott and I then went to the
artillery compound, got the gunners of their bunkers, and ordered them to
direct fire into the tree line. I requested an air strike west of the
camp. The FAC on station offered the "Spectre" Gunship as a
solution. The second tank in the woodline was either destroyed by
"Spectre" or the lO5mm direct fire. I suspect that the "Spectre" actually
did the job as there was the appearance of "flashbulbs" going off on the
back deck of the tank just prior to it blowing up.

I must dispute the after action reports that claim the tanks stayed
exclusively in the woodline and supported the infantry. In daylight
hours this was true; at night, this was not the case. Twice on the night
of 5 April, T-54s rolled through the perimeter from the west and back out
on the airfield side. The first time this happened they were hardly
noticed because of the intense indirect fire assault on Loc Ninh. The
second time this happened the 106mm engaged them with canister! The
commander and driver of both tanks were killed. The tanks then sat in the
wire to the east, next to the airfield, for about thirty minutes. There
was no Spectre on station at the time; and, the FAC on station and I both
thought the tanks were knocked out of action. I was called by the
defenders on the east of the compound as the 174th NVA Regiment was
making a ground assault across the airfield. I called for CBU and
NAPALM. This forced them to withdraw. The real objective of
their attack became obvious when two new drivers from the 174th
Regiment drove the "knocked out" tanks into the rubber trees across
the airfield. During this entire first day, I tried to coordinate
with Major Davidson and Captain Wanat in the District Compound.
Captain Wanat would get out of the bunker, look around, and
report targets. He reported the mortars firing from the swimming pool on
the grounds of the plantation house. These mortars were subsequently
destroyed by Spectre. He also alerted me to the presence of an
NVA forward observer located on the top floor of the plantation house.
General Hung would not clear "Spectre" to fire on the plantation house.
As a result, LTC Schott and I took with 106mm canister fire. During
this entire period, Major Davidson whined on the radio. His complaint
was that I was "hogging all the air strikes" for the main compound. A
simple look at a picture of Loc Ninh from' the air, however, will
show that all these compounds were interconnected. I told him to get off
the bunker and look at where the air was going in. Later in the night
Captain Wanat described the Major as being "distraught." Under
the circumstances, I think the Captain's words were most kind.
I consider Major Davidson's actions as being most unprofessional,
to the point of being childish and cowardly. Nothing that
happened, to include his "escape" from Loc Ninh, alters my initial
impression that this officer acted in a cowardly fashion throughout
the battle.

At approximately 2200 hours, 5 April, I saw Colonel Vini tell
his bodyguard and two other soldiers to do something. They donned flack
jackets and helmets. They then sprinted from the bunker. I finally
ascertained, upon their return, that Vinh had ordered them to open the
gates of the compound. Vinh explained: "we had do this so we can run out
easier". By this time we had approximately one hundred wounded, from
all compounds, in the hospital bunker. Colonel Vinh was preparing to
desert them and run away. I seriously considered shooting Vinh
there and then bur I had not reached that point yet; that would come later.

The remainder of the first night was basically artillery fire on
the compounds. I established with the FACs (Note 4) and the Spectre
Gunships, that only I would clear each target and would provide my
initials to take responsibility. From that point on they never
allowed anyone, including Vinh and General Hung, to cancel a target.

At 0500 hours, 6 April, I saw tracers coming up from the area
of the rubber plantation office and processing plant. These were east of
the airfield and I ordered them destroyed by NAPALM and 250 pound bombs,
("Snake & Nape"). This was done and no more fire came from that area.
Amazingly, I also saw tracers coming from the police station on the edge
of town. The brave policemen and one policewoman continued to hold out.

At 0900 hours, 6 April, I was informed by a Spectre Gunship that an
anti-aircraft gun on a vehicle was firing from the village square
in Loc Ninh. I cleared Spectre to engage this target. I refused
to allow jet aircraft to engage this target to protect the Loc Ninh
village from collateral damage. At approximately 1100 hours, I was
notified by the forces on the east side of the perimeter that women and
children were coming up the road from the village. This was verified
by the FAC on station (Note 1). When LTC Schott and I climbed to
the top of bunker, we saw one of the most pitiful sights I have ever
witnessed. The NVA were forcing the children and teachers to walk
toward the compounds carrying an American flag. I fired in front of
them and they fled back into the village. At approximately 1400
hours, the lone survivor, from the Recon Company, reported tanks and
infantry moving toward Loc Ninh from the west in regimental strength.
I called for air strikes on these targets. The soldier on the radio
adjusted this fire until the bombs were heard on our radio and
transmissions ceased. I did not know his name but he was a real hero.

At 1700 hours, 6 April, Loc Ninh's main compound was overrun the first
time by infantry. Elements of the 174th Regiment attacked in company
strength across the airfield and a battalion of E-6 Regiment attacked
from the west. The company from the 174th massed and tried to run
through the front gate as a group. They were decimated by the CBU that
I called onto the camp's perimeter. The battalion from the west
stopped in the wire when Spectre engaged their supporting tanks.
The tanks turned tail and ran. Earlier that morning two TOC radio
operators, the regimental surgeon, and myself had crawled into the barbed
wire on the west perimeter. With LTC Schott and SGT Lull covering us, we
placed claymore mines and white phosphorous grenades behind the six
"FOOGAS" drums on that side. We then attached the mines and grenades to
a blasting machine with communications wire. When I climbed the steps,
I saw hundreds of NVA "standing" in the wire and the ARVN soldiers staring
at them. When I detonated the "FOOGAS", it was brutal, as if coming
out of a daze the ARVN soldiers began firing. The NVA battalion was
decimated. When I went outside to check the soldiers, a single
T-54 Tank rolled from the woodline and entered the perimeter. I
grabbed an M-72 LAW and fired directly into the front of the tank. The
tank and crew were not impressed! Finally, Spectre munitions
"sparkled" on the rear deck of the tank and it took a round into the engine
compartment. The defenders on the bunker line then killed the crew
as they exited the tank. That evening when I checked the bunker
lines, the 9th Regiment was down to about fifty defenders. There were
about 150 wounded in the hospital bunker. The regimental surgeon
and I went to the hospital and ordered all who could walk back to the
perimeter. There was no whining, they just went and did their duty.

As the surgeon and I were putting the wounded on the
perimeter, I noticed that the disabled enemy tank was gone. I
questioned a young soldier in the bunker near where the tank had been
sitting concerning what had happened to the tank. He explained:
"Another pair of tanks had come out of the rubber trees and drug
the disabled tank away." I then asked him why he had not fired his X-72
LAW at the tanks. In response, he said "the tanks were nor shooting
and he didn't want to make them mad." I understood his reasoning and
could only pat him on the shoulder to convey my feelings. It is my
experience that the M72-LAW is ineffective when attacking the frontal armor
of the T54 Tank.

That night Colonel Vinh ordered all the warm soda pop stored in the TOC
be opened and passed out to the troops. This was Colonel Vinh's
last contribution to the battle. He had stripped off his uniform and was
wearing only white under shorts and a T-shirt. He told me we would have to
surrender soon. He advised me to keep a white shirt handy. He also
told me we were lucky because we were officers. We could surrender.
Junior enlisted men would be shot by the NVA. The regimental surgeon
confirmed Vinh's statement. We went around the perimeter and told all the
Border Rangers to strip to their underwear and try to get to the Cam Le
bridge. This was done because it was generally accepted that the
Montagnard, Cambodian, and Nhung soldiers would be executed by the NVA.
It was then that I learned that most of the unwounded Infantry soldiers
on the perimeter were from the 2nd FSB Alpha and the bridge. They
stated that they had been given the option to go north, south, or
stay. This group had come to Loc Ninh. That night about twenty men
straggled in from the 3rd Battalion which had been located south of the
camp. The 3rd Battalion had been virtually wiped out by the NVA 272nd
Regiment on the high ground south of the camp.

That night, 6 April, at approximately 2000 hours, lights were
seen in the open south of the camp. I directed CBU and NAPALM
onto the lights. These lights were within 500 meters of the barbed wire.
I did not determine until the next evening what they were. At about 2300
hours, two 240mm rockets landed almost simultaneously on the Loc Ninh
Infantry and Artillery compounds. What these notoriously inaccurate,
weapons achieved is amazing. One struck the hospital bunker, killing
every wounded soldier and medic inside. The regimental surgeon was with me
and was spared. The other hit the ammunition dump, in the Artillery
compound, and totally destroyed the guns and soldiers. General
Hollingsworth, who was flying overhead at the time, said: "it
looked like a nuclear explosion."

At 2330 hours, 6 April there was another major attack from the east
across the airfield and through the wire from the west. This was repulsed
with air strikes and the last few rounds of 106mm canister
ammunition. After the attack, Sergeant Wallingford and Michael
Dummond brought food and encouragement from the inner perimeter. I
did not see Major Carlson; the others said he was manning the radio.
Sergeant Lull had become moody and refused to leave the bunker after
the second major attack. He asked what my plan was and I said: "To
fight." He was not happy with my response. Though he had been wounded
only slightly, his mental attitude had greatly deteriorated.

LTC Schott and I moved throughout the perimeter that night and used a
portable radio to direct air strikes. We were both wounded a number
of times during the night (Note 3) and LTC Schott kept repeating:
"I'm glad you are here" By early morning, I noted that there was some
mental deterioration in LTC Schott. I believe it was caused by the head
wound he had received on the first night of the battle. Despite his head
wound, LTC Schott continued to fight throughout the battle. His bravery
under fire is unquestionable and he gave me his loyalty and support to the
very end of the fight. I further believe this mental deterioration
significantly influenced his actions on the following day.

Early on the morning of 7 April Loc Ninh became strangely quiet.
There were occasional artillery rounds and mortars but little else.
It was as if the attacking force and the defending force were holding their
breath for some reason. I increased the air strikes to the west and
observed numerous secondary explosions. I also cleared the Spectre
Gunship on station to fire at will into the plantation house and
grounds. Major Davidson, during this phase of the battle,
continued to periodically come up on the radio from his bunker and
complain the lack of fire support he was receiving. His statements were
totally absurd and embarrassed LTC Schott, Major Carlson, Captain
Wanat, Sergeant Wallingford and myself. The FACs tried to reassure him,
to no avail. Major Davidson was scared to death.

About 0700 hours, 7 April, there was another major ground attack, from
the west and north from the town of Loc Ninh itself. Tanks entered the
perimeter from the west. One T-54 Tank chased me around the perimeter
until I could get behind it and shoot an into its rear section. During
this "chase" Captain Dey, a brave helicopter pilot from the 1st of the 9th
Cavallry, tried to draw the tank's fire off of me with his LOH. In fact,
it is most probable his actions enabled me to eventually destroy the
tank (Note 7).

Captain Dey also observed the mass of bodies in the barbed wire and the
trench lines. Many of the bodies were entangled, friend and foe,
indicating that at some point in the late evening hours of 6 April the
fighting had been close quarter, "hand-to-hand", combat.

At approximately 0800 hours, 7 April, Colonel Vinh, his loyal
body guards still trailing him, ran out through the front gate of Loc
Ninh and surrendered. The 9th Regiment Executive Officer (XO)
observing Colonel Vinh's desertion and surrender, immediately ran
from the bunker toward the inner perimeter. I understood why only
when I saw him begin to lower the flag of the Republic of Vietnam. When
I observed his action, I ran after him. When I reached him he
was pulling off his white T-shirt which he then ran up to the top of
the flag pole, signifying to the NVA that we were surrendering. I
demanded that he pull the T-shirt down from the pole. We argued and
fought for the rope. As we were fighting over possession of the rope, I
glanced around and saw all of the soldiers in the TOC were watching
from the doorway and other soldiers on the perimeter were starting
to strip off-their shirts. It appeared that the XO's act of
surrender was going to end the battle then and there. As the
commander, I felt the defenders of Loc Ninh could hold on until
reinforcements or firepower could be provided to enable us to
prevail over the NVA. Accordingly, I shot the XO dead and hauled down the
white flag. The soldiers, upon observing my actions, put their shirts
back on and faced out again to defend the perimeter. I do not know if
anyone put up another white flag after I shot the XO. I assume that it
was his white T-shirt that was observed by some pilots. This shirt,
however, flew for no more than five or ten minutes.

From this point through the end of the battle things became absolutely
bizarre. A major attack at about 0930 hours, 7 April, required that I
call for air strikes on the camp itself. I lost all communications with
the other members of the team on the inner perimeter. I was later
told that they had been forced to hide inside the roof when chased from
the bunker by a tank. At 1115 hours two APCs entered the front gate.
Initially we thought these were 1st Cavalry troops but when the
ramps lowered, NVA soldiers piled out.

At 1000 hours, 7 April, a flight of B-52 aircraft made a
bombing run west of Loc Ninh. During the bombing mission there was a
short lapse in air support over Loc Ninh; but this, as some claim, did not
cause the fall of Loc Ninh. Also, during the B-52 strike a LOH from 1st of
the 9th Cavalry came in and attempted to rescue friendly personnel. I
left the bunker with an M-60 Machine Gun and covered the Vietnamese
soldiers jumping onto the skids of the LOH. During this action I was
shot by NVA soldiers coming across the airfield. Contrary to previous
reports by the LOH helicopter pilots, the personnel who pulled me to
my feet were ARVN Rangers, not NVA soldiers (Note 8).

I returned to the TOC and asked for all available fire power to destroy
the camp (Note 9). SFC Lull then grabbed the radio handset and
screamed "no NAPALM". Major Davidson also came on the net and yelled "no
NAPALM". LTC Schott then took the handset and talked to "someone". He
recommended me for a high award and signed off. At that moment I
told Schott and Lull that we should now fight our way out. Colonel Schott
said he couldn't make it with his wounds and that Lull and I should go. I
said, "that's it, we all stay". As the NVA began to throw satchel charges
into the bunker, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Schott, understanding there
was no time to argue; believing he could not physically endure an
attempt to E & E, and knowing I would not leave him; sat down on a stool
and shot himself between the eyes with his own .45 caliber pistol. LTC
Schott's action was not an act of fear, Dick Schott died to save SFC
Lull and myself. I have heard disparaging remarks about LTC Schott's
action from a number of people, including some General Officers. In
response to these people, I say: "On the best day of your life, you
should hope to be half as brave as LTC Richard Schott." His was
an act of sacrifice, not personal desperation. He died for me!
No one else was there, except Lull. No one has the right to judge Dick
Schott except for me because I was there. He is the bravest man I have ever
known. He is dead, not missing in action (MIA) and the North
Vietnamese know it! Then I went to the roof the NVA entered the
bunker. They cut off LTC Schott's collar and name tag and, then tried
to cut off his head. During this, SFC Howard Lull and twelve ARVN
soldiers "played dead" in the TOC!

I went to the roof of the bunker and tried to organize the three
soldiers left in the trench line. They just ran back and forth yelling
"May Bay" the Vietnamese word for helicopter. I tried to call for air
support on the radio but it was destroyed by gunfire from an NVA who
had mounted a tower in the inner perimeter. One bullet went through
my radio, and the back pack, and entered my back. This bullet, or part
of it, lodged in the base of my left lung (Note 3).

Immediately after I was shot, by the NVA soldier located on the inner
perimeter tower, I saw a LOH swooping in on my position from the west. He
headed straight toward me. At the same moment I saw NVA coming out of the
bunker line to fire on the LOH. I tried to wave him off as I no
longer had a radio. Finally, just before he flared to land, I shot out
his windshield and the LOH moved away to the South (Note 7).

I re-entered the bunker and killed three NVA who were
attempting to cut off LTC Schott's head. The instant they were dead, SFC
Lull and the twelve ARVN soldiers "came back to life". I tried to organize
the thirteen people and with the Regimental Surgeon, who came down the
other stairwell, led them outside. We retook two bunkers on the bunker
line. We held these bunkers until 1830 hours. Then as "Spectre"
made a pass on targets to the west, we escaped through the mine field
to the southwestJust on the other side of the perimeter road, a
squad of NVA jumped up and engaged us. During this engagement I was shot
in the groin with a pistol. I also received a small schrapnel wound in the
lower right abdomen (Note 3).

We returned fire and killed all five NVA but my bowels filled
with blood and I had to pull down my pants and defecate. While I was in
this position, SFC Howard Lull stood up and announced that I had to
be left behind. I was virtually immobile and so physically and
emotionally drained that I could only cry. SFC Howard Lull and all but
two of the ARVN soldiers chose to desert me. They moved toward a
hill mass where they felt they would be secure until they could
escape or be rescued. The Regimental Surgeon and my bodyguard,
Corporal Hen, stayed with me. We started south and avoided any
movement by the NVA. When we reached the small stream bed about 500
meters south of the camp, we saw what the lights the night
before were from. A reinforced company had tried to dig into the walls
of the stream bed. They were still there, almost all had been killed by
the CBU and NAPALM. We looked at the wounded; they looked at us; we
moved on. During the night we observed a massive air strike go onto the
hill mass that SFC Lull and the ARVNs had run up. I believe they
were killed by the air strike. Subsequent to my capture the NVA
Commander told me they had all been killed. During this night, we had
three contacts with the NVA. After the third contact we were all crawling
from exhaustion and wounds.

At 0800 hours, 8 April, I spotted a FAC. I used my LRRP
mirror to signal him. In response, the FAC called in a flight of two fast
movers dropping CBU. I was again wounded (Note 3). We fled, as best
we could, toward the rubber trees south of the camp. As we
stumbled up the hill, I saw a white rice bowl fall to the ground. I
shot the soldier who was eating with my pistol and we continued on.
The next thing I saw was a huge orange flash and then my left leg
was knocked from under me (Note 3). I was knocked unconscious. When I
came to my senses, I had a great weight on my head. An NVA soldier was
standing on my head. I saw them shoot my bodyguard dead. They
were lining up the Regimental Surgeon when I forced my way to my feet.
I tried to shoot my .45 caliber pistol but the slide was back and
it was empty. The NVA just took it out of my hand. I explained that
they did not want to kill a doctor. He could help them. Right or wrong,
I intended to preserve at least one friend from that battle. The
Surgeon cursed me for telling them he was a doctor but the NVA let him live.
He was eventually released with me in 1973.

When they took me to their headquarters an older officer ran down the
hill and hit me across the face with a bamboo stick (Note 3). A
distinguished looking officer then ran down the hill and threw the man who
had hit me aside. He kicked the man and told him in Vietnamese that I
was a good soldier. The whacking came because the doctor had,
inadvertently, called me "Zippo". It seems that "our friend"
Colonel Vinh had told the NVA much during his short stay with them.
The distinguished looking officer had me undressed and my wounds
treated. Treatment was superficial at best. They tried to give me food
but I was afraid to eat because of the abdominal wounds. The
interpreter, who spoke perfect English, told me I had been captured by the
272nd Regiment, 9th NVA Division. He further stated that I was
the guest of the "Group Commander", "Mr. Tra". When I asked if he
didn't mean Regiment or Division Commander, he said that Mr. Tra had many
Divisions.

Soon, my old jeep arrived carrying Major Carlson, SGT
Wallingford, and Mick Dummond. Mr. Tra had no words for any of them.
We were added to the load in the jeep and i was then tied to the floor
boards. We went to the West until we reached the road to the scissor
bridge. We then went North to the river and east back toward QL13.
When a Spectre Gunship flew over they laid branches on the jeep and
left me tied to the floor board. They also left the engine running. I
knew the destruction Spectre did to tanks and I couldn't even imagine
what it would do a jeep. Although I probably gave away a secret, I
finally yelled to them, in Vietnamese, to turn off the engine. At QL13
we crossed the underwater bridge. We also met up with a number of
captured ARVN M577 vehicles hauling items for the NVA. When we reached
Snoul, I was given additional medical treatment for the benefit of
photographers.

Carlson and Wallingford told me how a tank had chased them out of their
bunker and how they had hidden in the roof of the bunker. Then Carlson
said he had been wounded in the chest, by a "Mini Gun" from one of the
Cobra helicopters. I told him that I was outside the bunker when the
Cobras were shooting and the only thing fired was "NAILS." He became
quite flustered and told me he was now ready to take command. SGT
Wallingford and I said "cold day in Hell." It seems that Ed
Carlson believed he was seriously wounded. According to Wallingford,
immediately after Carlson was hit, he was bleeding a lot and Sergeant
Wallingford gave him a shot of coagulant. It was too much coagulant
because Carlson began to hallucinate. While hallucinating, Carlson tried
to shoot at things coming out of the bunker wall and had to be disarmed.
At some time on 8 April, the NVA heard Carlson, Wallingford, and
Dummond in the bunker and began pouring gasoline onto the bunker and into
the firing ports. The defenders assumed the NVA objective was to
burn them out. The Americans, the Frenchman, and the ARVN crawled out
of the bunker and surrendered because they feared being burned alive.

On 9 April 1972, I was again taken to see Mr. Tra. He was now in
Snoul. He said I would be well treated and that he would check on me. I
interpreted his comment as soldier to soldier talk, not propaganda.
That night we were separated from Mick Dummond and driven to the East
on QL13. Late that night we were taken out of the jeep and walked all
the rest of the night to a prison near to Kratie, Cambodia. They took my
shoes and clothes. I marched in GI socks and a Sarong. The next morning we
waited outside the camp. This was because the NVA didn't want us to see
any other prisoners. While we waited, Major Carlson and Ken
Wallingford counted my visible wounds. There were, from head to toe,
thirty eight (38) holes in my body (Note 3).

In closing this report of my observations on the Battle of Loc Ninh, I
state: There were those on the ground and in the air can debate their own
participation and performance; as for my performance, the Battle of Loc
Ninh was mine - I ran it all! For better or for worse, I did it.'

MARK A. SMITH
Major (Retired)
United States Army
Ground Commander, Battle of Loc Ninh




BATTLE OF LOG NINH 4 thru 8 April 1972

ENEMY FRIENDLY UNITS

5 VC Div - Heavy Losses 1 Bn, 48 Regt *

E6 Regt 9th Regt (-21/2 Bns)

174 Regt 1 B n, 52 Regt *

275 Regt 1st ACR Troop *

429 Sapper Gp (-) 74th Ranger Bn *

203 Tank Regt 1 Bn, RF/PF

69th Arty Div * Never arrived at Loc Ninh

208 Rocket Regt

42 Arty Regt

271 Anti-Aircraft Regt

Total forces destroyed in BINH LONG Province battles - 1 April to 25
June:
5 VC Div - 90% destroyed

7 NVA Div - 90% destroyed

9 VC Div - 90% destroyed

203 Tank Regt - 100% destroyed

202 Tank Regt (-) - 100% destroyed

101 NVA Regt (Independent) - 90% destroyed

205 VC Regt (Independent) - 90% destroyed

69 Arty Div - 85% destroyed one regiment of AAA (. 51 cal, 23mm,

37mm, SA-7 missile, 57mm). One Regt of Arty (105mm, 155mm, 120mm mortars,

82mm mortars). One Rocket Regt - 122mm rockets, 240mm rockets and 107mm

rockets.



The following were the estimated TO&E strengths of the units prior to battles:

5 VC Div - 9,230 205 NVA Regt - 1,250

Hq & Spt 4,680 101 Regt - 760

275 Regt 1,550 429 Sapper Gp - 1,705 (Only 9 B:

174 Regt 1,500 10 Bn, and 14 Bn in An Loc for to

E6 Regt 1,500 of 320. )

7 NVA Ziv - 8,600

14l Regt 1,500

165 Regt 1,500

209 Regt 1,500

271 Regt 2,000

272 Regt 2,000

69 Arty Command - 4,980

Hq & Spt 1,395

42 Arty Regt 800

96 Arty Regt 1,150 (Not in battle in An Loc. Deployed in SV AYRIENG area)

208 Rocket Regt 835

271 AAA Regt 800


ENEMY TROOPS OPERATING IN AN LOC

5 VC Div 9,230

7 NVA Div 8,600

9 VC Div 10,680

69 Arty Cmd 3,830

101 Regt 760

205 Regt 1,250

429 Sapper Gp 32O (Represents 9, 10, and 14 Bn as deployed
AN LOC)
TOTAL 34,670 (In addition the units at AN LOC received

approximately 15,000 replacements. The

total estimated strength of 800 for

203 Tank Regt and 202 Sp Wpns Tank

Regt is not included in this total.

The following is a list of weapons observed in MR 3 for the first time

during the war:

TANKS T54, PT76, M41 (CLA from ARVN)

AA GUN 37mm, 23mm, ZSU-57-Z SP

MISSILES SA-7 G/A (STRELLA), AT-3 G/G (SAGGER)

APC BTR - 50PK

ARTY 105mm, 155mm (CLA from ARVN)


END-NOTES

1. Airborne FAC: SUNDOG-22
(On station during most of battle.)

2. LTC Ginger, Senior Advisor 52nd Regiment.

3. Medical report Letterman Army Medical Center.

4. All "RANCE" and "SUNDOG" FACs.

5. Captain George Wanat: Loc Ninh Deputy District Advisor.
Captain Richard Dey: 1/9 Cavalry LOH pilot.
USAF Forward Air Controllers: SUNDOC-XX FACs.

6. After Action Report: Engagement of Soviet Armor on the
Vietnam Battlefield, 1973, Fort Benning, Georgia.

7. Medal of Honor (MOH) statement, written by
Captain Richard Dey.

8. See statements of Captain John Whitehead, Colonel Casey,
and Brigadier General Hamlin, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

9. Air Force Monograph Series:
Airpower in the Spring Offensive, 1972




ADDENDUMS

(1) Annex A: ARVN-Task Organization, Loc Ninh
as of 5 April 1972

(2) Annex B: Personnel Rosters and Call Signs,
Loc Ninh (U.S. & ARVN)

(3) Annex C: Biographies of Selected Personnel

(4) Annex D: POW Camp, Cambodia


ANNEX A

ARVN-TASK ORGANIZATION, LOC NINH, AS OF 5 APRIL 1972

UNIT: LOCATION:

9th Regiment Headquarters Loc Ninh
Headquarters Company Loc Ninh
Reconnaissance Company Northwest of Loc Ninh
* 1-9th Battalion Bu Dop
(Opcon, Song Be Province)

* 2-9th Battalion Loc Ninh
Headquarters Company Loc Ninh
2 Rifle Companies TF 1-5
2 Rifle Companies Cam Le Bridge (1 Company
returned to Loc Ninh,
6 Apr 72)

* 3-9th Battalion
Headquarters Company Loc Ninh
2 Rifle Companies South of Loc Ninh
2 Rifle Companies Loc Ninh

TF 1-5
1st ACR (-) Fire Support Base - Alpha
2 Rifle Co's., 2-9 Infantry Fire Support Base - Alpha
2 Ranger Companies Fire Support Base - Alpha
1st Cavalry TRP (-) Intersection, QL13/QL14
(5 APCs, 1 Tank)

* Note: The 9th Regiment was organized with four (4) small rifle companies
per battalion.




ANNEX B

LOC NINH PERSONNEL ROSTERS AND CALL SIGNS

U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS: CALL SIGN:

TRAC:
MG James Hollingsworth Danger 79
BG John McGiffert Dynamite 6

5th DCAT:
Col William Miller Little Man

1st Air Cavalry:
BG Hamlin 1st Hoss
Col Casey Unknown
Cpt John Whitehead Unknown
Cpt Richard Dey Unknown

9th RCAT:
LTC Richard Schott Zippo - Big Dick
Maj Albert E. Carlson Zippo - Fast Ed
Cpt Mark A. Smith Zippo
SFC Howard Lull Zippo - Lima
SGT Kenneth Wallingford Zippo - Echo Five

Loc Ninh Distric Advisory Team:
Maj Davidson 66
Cpl George Wanat 66A

TF 52:
LTC Ginger Unknown

U.S. Air Force Forward Air Controllers:
Sundog FAC Sundog-XX
Rance FAC Rance-XX
Spectre Gunships Spectre-XX
XX-numerical designation



ARVN MILITARY: CALL SIGN:

THIRD REGION:
Commanding General; LTG Minh Unknown

5th ARVN DIVISION:
Commanding General; BG Hung Unknown

9th ARVN REGIMENT:
Commander; Col Vinh Unknown

LOC NINH DISTRICT:
Chief; (Name unknown) Unknown

ARVN CAVALRY REGIMENT:
Commander; (Name unknown) Unknown

TF 52:
Commander; (Name unknown) Unknown

OTHERS:
French photo-Journalist:
Michael Dummond None


(page 24 not included)

by a junior officer. There are others who would have tried to muddle
through. "Muddling through" however, was not Dick Schott's stlyle
Within moments of the battle's opening rounds, he passed control to the
junior officer. He then protected that officer from friend and foe
alike for the duration of his involvement in the battle. He had an
ego to protect, as all men do, but he felt that winning this battle was
more important than his personal stature. As an act of bravery to
protect "his people" during the final moments of this battle, Colonel
Schott killed himself when he believed he was physically incapable of
escaping and had become a burden that would cause the death or capture of
others at Loc Ninh. He took this brutal action when I refused to leave him
at Loc Ninh; he sacrificed his life to save others. This selfless act
is the epitome of bravery and is as old as soldiering itself. He was
awarded the Silver Star. The "record" lists him as MIA. He is dead!

ALBERT E. CARLSON:

Major Carlson was not supposed to be at the battle of Loc
Ninh. He should have been in Thailand with his' wife.
Unfortunately, this was on his mind throughout the battle. He was
an Artillery Officer and had not been a participant in a major
battle prior to Loc Ninh. He was a staff advisor In the 9th RCAT. He
did not participate in the decision making process during the battle at
Loc Ninh. He was not in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), but
he was where he had been ordered to be, the inner perimeter. When LTC
Schott and I were wounded, he came through the fire to help us. This
was his finest moment during the battle and he should be recognized
for it. It is inappropriate for Ed Carlson to make comments on the
fighting of the tactical battle because he doesn't know! When he
asserts that he assumed a leadership role in the prisoner of war (POW)
camp, he is lying. The leader in prison was the same officer who
commanded the battle. Major Carlson was awarded the Silver Star. He
remains on active duty with the U.S. Army. Current rank:
Colonel.

SFC HOWARD LULL:

Sergeant First Class Lull was an non-commissioned officer
(NCO) of long experience in Vietnam. However, he possessed only
limited experience in major battles. He had done exceptionally well when
he accompanied me on previous operations. Sergeant Lull had been
previously recommended for the Silver Star. When the battle began he
had the trust and confidence of the personnel at Loc Ninh. When it
became apparent that the battle would end in defeat he violated this
trust confidence. On two occasions he had to be physically restrained
by LTC Schott from calling for helicopter extraction of advisory personnel.
When LTC Schott and I went to the bunker line Lull would disappear. He
apparently began to feel his mortality. In the final moments of the
battle, he "played dead" when the commnd bunker was overrun by the
NVA. During the attempted escape and evasion (E&E), he deserted his
wounded commander on the battlefield. I believe he is dead. He is listed
as MIA. He was awarded the Silver Star.

SGT KENNETH WALLINGFORD:

Ken Wallingford had served at Lai Khe prior to being assigned to
the 9th RCAT. He was a young aggressive NCO, though he intended to
leave the military on his DEROS. Nonetheless, he was brave and cocky and
he had the "paratrooper mentality"! When he and Major Carlson were
wounded by a helicopter gunship, he took charge and patched both of
their wounds. While under fire, he came to the TOC to help when LTC
Schott and I were wounded. He came again and brought food. He was a brave
and loyal soldier during the battle, as he was loyal and supportive
while in the prison camp. He was a fine soldier and a good and decent
man. He was awarded the Silver Star.

MAJ DAVIDSON:

Major Davidson came to Loc Ninh District to relieve the assigned Senior
Advisor, Major Blair, who was on R&R leave. He was an Armor Officer.
From the opening moments of the battle he complained about the air
support for his compound. His complaints were absurd. As time went
on and the situation became more desperate, he began to whine. His
final act of disgrace during the battle was to desert Captain George
Wanat while under fire. He is the only advisor to escape death or
capture. His overriding concern was for self preservation. This
was the driving force behind both his desertion and subsequent escape.
He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. He remains on active duty
with the U.S. Army. Current rank: Colonel.

CPT GEORGE WANAT:

Captain Wanat is unique. He proudly stated that he was one of the few
people to ever graduate from Norwich University as a "Senior Private" in
the Cadet Corps. He was the epitome of an Armor officer, opinionated,
brave, and audacious. He was the only calming voice in the
district compound. He continuously went outside, while under fire,
to observe targets for me. He tried to help Major Davidson cope
with the impending doom of defeat at Loc Ninh. When Major Davidson
and the District Chief ran away and left him, Captain Wanat soldiered
on. He evaded capture for thirty one days. He was finally betrayed by
fearful villagers. In prison he was brutalized by his captors but
he never gave up; nor was he ever broken. Subsequent to his release from
prison, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross based on my
recommendation.

CPT MARK A. SMITH:

Ground Commander, Battle of Loc Ninh. Call sign "Zippo" Escaped
from Loc Ninh - captured 8 April 1972. Interned in prison camp in
Cambodia. Awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Retired with the rank
of Major.

STATEMENT

While serving as Commander of Loc Ninh RVN, Defence Forces from 4 April 1972
to 7 April 1972, CPT Mark A. Smith, 545-66-3270 distinguished , -' - .".
himself by extra-ordinary valor and beyond the call of duty. On 1 April
1972 Loc Ninh RVN came under heavy and continuous artillery and rocket
attack. My unit, F Troo[, 9th U.S. Cavalry, was supporting units in the
area around Loc Ninh.On 4 April 1972 elements of the 5th NVA
Division, 2 regiments of tanks and a division or artillery
began anassault of Loc Ning. Cpt. Smith, who was using the call sign
"Zippo" continuously exposed himself without regard for personal safety
to direct airstrikes and artillery on his own position.
From 4 April 1972 to 7 April 1972 my unit's AH-1G's were ,
continuously firing salvos of rockets into the compound under
direction of CPT "ZIPPO" Smith. On 5 April 1972, I was
enroute to Quan Loi to resupply an artillery unit when I
monitored CPT "ZIPPO" Smith directing napalm strikes on his own
tactical operations center, which he was in at the time. As the fighting
intensified we were monitoring the radios and although other Americans
were in the compound and on radios, only one individual seemed to be
in control or the situation and that was "ZIPPO".
The others talking on the radios were emotional and confused. On 7 April
1972 I was to fly into Loc Ninh to attempt the rescue seven Americans.
During the briefing from MG Hollingsworth, the situation was presented
as hopeless as the forces at Loc Ninh were overwhelmingly outnumbered
and all the Americans were seriously wounded. MG Hollingsworth indicated
that the rescue attempt was a last ditch effort to save the Americans.
That morning during a recon of Loc Ninh, I witnessed a battle between
CPT "ZIPPO" Smith and a tank in the perimeter, during which CPT Smith
was chased throughout the compound until he was finally able to destroy the
tank with a Light AntiTank Weapon. At approximately 1400 hours
I left Song Be enroute to Loc Ninh in an OH6A followed by two AK1G's. Our
flight was preceeded by air strikes that included a vomit agent directly
on the compound. CPT "ZIPPO" Smith told MG Hollingsworth during our
flight not to allow the helicopters to fly into the compound as the
enemy fire would destroy them. When I approached the compound I
saw hundreds of bodies throughout the area, many of them entangled
which indicated the ferocity of the fighting. There were several tanks
and APC's in the compound. As I approached the landing site CPT "Zippo"
Smith fired a volley of rounds from his M16 which triggered the enemy's
helicopter ambush. My aircraft was severely damaged and the rescue attempt
was called off. As I departed the area, CPT "ZiPPO" Smith asked MG
Hollinsworth to call in all the availble air support and artillery to
destroy his position. After the airstikes and artillery rolled in,
radio contact with CPT Smith ceased. These examples of personal sacrifice
in the face insurmountable odds, are indicative of CPT Smith's devotion
duty, courage and concern for protection of other US Forces.
Throughout the battle, CPT Smith was cool, confident and collected.
Due to the hopelessness of the situation, he refused to allow the sacrifice
of many more Americans who were trying to rescue him and the others at
Loc Ninh.

(signed)

RICHARD D. DEY
CPT, IN
548-78-9278



CPT JOHN WHITEHEAD:

Captain Whitehead was a LOH pilot. He attempted to rescue
Vietnamese and Advisors from Loc Ninh. In the end he rescued
Vietnamese as I laid down covering fire. Captain John Whitehead
is a hero! He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his
actions at Loc Ninh. He remains on active duty with the U.S. Army.
His current rank is Colonel.

CPT RICHARD DEY:

Captain Dey was a LOH pilot. While under fire, he attempted
to rescue me from the top of a bunker which was also receiving hostile
fire. Richard Dey was totally fearless! He was unaware the NVA
were using me as the bait; and were in position to ambush his LOH
during the extraction. He was wounded when I, not having a radio, fired
on his LOH to drive him away. He, too, is a hero! Award unknown. He is
now a civilian.

MR. MICHAEL DUMMOND:

Mick Dummond was invited by me to the battle of Loc wounded
and continued to take his photos. He was a true professional, with a
natural affinity for combat soldiers. Subsequent to being captured, he
was separated from the Americans at Snoul, Cambodia. As a Frenchman, and for
propaganda purposes, he was released by the NVA on Bastille Day, 1972. He
wrote a book concerning his experiences and I believe he now lives in
Canada.

COL VINH:

Colonel Vinh was an older officer liked by all, respected by
none. He stated that he had been a prisoner of the Peoples Army of
Vietnam (PAVN) while serving in the French Colonial Army. He stated
that being a POW was much better than being dead. Prior to the battle he
promised advisor personnel he would request certain critical ammunition
items. This he did not do. Once the battle was joined he was totally
ineffective. His staff and subordinate Commanders, with the exception of
his XO, ignored his order to surrender on the last day of the
battle. His final act of disgrace was to surrender himself, while
his soldiers fought on. He made propaganda broadcasts for the enemy while
in captivity.

DISTRICT CHIEF:

This officer's name is unknown. He was a Vietnamese Ranger,
holding the rank of major. Prior to the battle, he had an excellent
reputation as a fighter and during the initial phases of this battle
he fought bravely. When all appeared lost, however, he whimpered with
Major Davidson. He also deserted Captain Wanat. He disgraced himself
in battle.


2-9th BATTALION COMMANDER:

This officer tried to rally his troops as they filtered into Loc Ninh.
He was last seen on the final day still fighting.

3-9th BATTALION COMMANDER:

This officer is believed to have been killed on the hill mass
south of Loc Ninh during the first night of the battle.

1st CAVALRY REGIMENT COMMANDER:

This soldier was a physically imposing Vietnamese officer. He
exuded confidence prior to the battle. His military stature was a
"facade" and a "sham". He subsequently disobeyed orders to fight and
tried to run. While his soldiers fought on, he surrendered. A
disgrace to his country and the uniform he wore.

74th RANGER BATTALION COMMANDER:

This officer fought on when the ist Cavalry surrendered.
He directed his troops to fight back to Loc Ninh. Many of his troops made
it through the NVA lines to Loc Ninh. On the final day of the battle,
when I released him to E&E, he led his remaining troops toward An Loc.
Some made it. He honored himself on the battlefield.

NOTE: Because the majority of the 74th Rangers were Montagnards and
Cambodians, it was well known what their treatment would be at the
hands of the NVA. Therefore, they were released for escape and evasion
at 0400 hours, 7 April 1972.

A SINGLE BRAVE RECON COMPANY SOLDIER:

I regret that I do not know this soldier's name. He was a member
of the Recon Company, 9th ARVN Regiment. His unit was overrun on the
first day of the battle. This soldier, however, evaded the
enemy and used his radio to coordinate with me. He coordinated all
air strikes to the West of the camp. Although he did not have a map,
he described the terrain. I fit his descriptions to the map. His
last call for fire was on himself. He is the Vietnamese soldier I
choose to remember from Loc Ninh. He was courageous! He is a hero in
anyman's Army.


ANNEX D

THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMP
KRATIE, CAMBODIA

After leaving the Corps Headquarters of General Tran Van Tra,
at Snoul, Cambodia, the American prisoners were taken by Chinese
jeep to the vicinity of Kratie, Cambodia. The NVA then turned the
prisoners over to the Camp prison guards and we were walked, in various
directions, throughout the night. This procedure was employed to
disorient the prisoners to the location of the POW camp. Major Carlson
and SGT Wallingford were still in uniform and were wearing their boots. I
had been stripped to a T-shirt and GI socks; and given a Camodian Sarong
to cover the lower portion of my body. The walk that night was
especially hard on Major Carlson. Primarily because his eye
glasses had been taken away from him. Without his eye glasses, Ed
Carlson was virtually blind. He also, truly believed that he had
suffered a "sucking chest wound". Fortunately for Ed this was not true.

The next day our group arrived at the POW camp. This camp had been in
the same general area for many years. When we arrived, there were
twenty American POWs in the camp. They were moved that day to avoid
contact with the new prisoners. The senior ranking POW (SRO) of the
prisoners was a Major Raymond Shrump. The camp also held a State
Department civilian named Douglas Ramsey. There was definitely one
other American, possibly two, who remained in the area after Major Shrump's
group of prisoners were moved out. These men were not held prisoner in
the classic sense but were, in fact, "turncoats" One man's name was
McKinley Nolan. I saw him only once, at a short distance. No
other prisoner from our group ever saw him. I did not tell the other
prisoners about him for reasons of morale. I did tell DIA about him and
also, subsequent to release, confirmed his presence and identity with
Ray Shrump. He had a wife and children, somewhere close by the
camp. The Vietnamese told me Nolan was a Major. I never actually saw
the other individual but heard him talking one day when I was taken to
interrogation. He, I have since come to believe, was Robert Greer.
Neither of these individuals were released from prison. During my
period of internment in this camp, the NVA also spoke of Bobby
Garwood. The NVA, however, at no time appeared to classify Garwood in the
same category as McKinley Nolan and Robert Greer. Bobby Garwood was, none
the less, held in a different category from other POWs who were captured
later in the war. According to the NVA, Garwood's conditions of
captivity were different because he had been captured during that period
of the war when the NVA held to a policy of releasing POWs. As such,
his treatment was always somewhat different.

The initial period that anyone spends in a prison camp is
usually one of uncertainty: "Will I be killed? Does anyone know I am
alive? Can I survive? Will I be tortured?" During our period of
confinement in this camp, however, the only prisoner who was actually
struck by a Vietnamese guard was me; and quite frankly, I was struck only
because I refused to comply with the order for me to enter a hole in
the ground in which the Vietnamese guards wanted to confine me. Each
time I refused to enter this hole in the ground, we would scuffle and
during each fight I would, of course, be struck a number of times
as the Vietnamese forced me into the hole.

This camp was commanded by an officer who was blind in one eye;
according to him, as a result of mistreatment by the French while he was
being held in a French POW camp some years before the current war.
The Vietnamese guards were all unusually fat. Their physical condition
indicated to me that much of the food intended for feeding the
POWs went to the guard's kitchen instead.

Each POW was chained inside a cage made of logs. Some were unchained
when they were sick. I, however, was never unchained. Every person in
the camp was either wounded or sick, at some period of their
confinement. The POW camp doctor was capable of providing treatment but
experienced great difficulty in obtaining permission from the Vietnamese
authorities to dispense medicine to POWs. I believe the camp's
medical supplies were of French manufacture. I further believe their
distribution was authorized by the U.S. Government. My belief stems
from the following: Subsequent to my release in 1973, I was told
by DIA personnel an operation run by LTC Schott and myself during March
1972 remained classified and I was not authorized to speak of it.
Nonetheless, this particular operation was conducted in support of POWs
imprisoned in Camboodia, using an Air America helicopter and an American
civilian from Saigon. Because I am authorized to discuss the
details of this mission I will only say I believe, after the raid on
Son Tay, there were secret agreements made concerning treatment of
POWs. These agreements must have pertained to the U.S. Government's
providing medical supplies like those used in our camp in return
for certain assurances concerning POW treatment and POW camp locations.

The NVA had a policy where-in they exchanged medical treatment
for favorable propaganda. Because they hoped I would make such an
exchange, the shrapnel wounds I received to my bowels were left
untreated. As a result, my lower intestines became seriously
infected and I was unable to have a bowel movement for a period
of forty five days. When it became apparent to the doctor that I
must receive treatment or die, he was allowed to administer an enema
prior to insertion of the enema, however, he had to first use
a nail to remove hardened feces from my rectum. He also offered to
provide penicillin, to which I am allergic. After receiving assurance
that there was no other anti-biotic available, I took the penicillin which
resulted in my developing only a mild rash.


Shortly after our arrival, Captain John Ray was brought to the camp.
Johnny Ray was captured on Nui Ba Den (The Black Virgin) Mountain
in Tay Ninh Province. He had been wounded by gunfire in the lower leg.
He was carried into camp. His leg was infected and after months of
trying to get the wound to close, the Vietnamese operated on him. A
surgeon was brought in from some place and the operation was performed
without administering an antisthetic. The operation, although obviously
painful, saved his leg.

Thirty five days after our capture, Captain George Wanat was brought
to the the camp. He was a mess! He appeared nearly dead. He
was wounded and had malaria. George Wanat had successfully escaped
and evaded (E&E) capture by hostile Vietnamese for thirty one days.
NVA Regulations required that each POW be given a mosquito net. George
was immediately issued small pieces of net, a needle, and some
thread. It was a sad sight to see this brave soldier, with trembling
body, trying to thread the needle, let alone sewing the pieces of net
together. In spite of North Vietnamese protests to the contrary, I believe
George's treatment, upon arrival in this camp, to have been a form
of physical and psychological torture. Captain Wanat was allowed, as
myself before him, to deteriorate to "death's door". This was the policy
toward anyone that might have the potential escape or provide propaganda.
When he was nearly dead, the communists "found" a new net for him.
During this same period, Major Carlson could obtain aspirin for a headache
because the NVA considered Ed as being incapable of escape; a correct
evaluation. In regard to Ed's conditions of confinement, he would, for
long periods, have to be put with other POWs because whenever he was placed
into solitary confinement, he would quickly deteriorate, mentally and
physically.

During my period of extreme illness, I made a decision which I have
come to regret. Ed Carlson was confined with me and I, for lack of medical
treatment, was dying. Under these circumstances, Ed, although trying to
help me survive, was being too vocal regarding his extreme worry
concerning his wife and son. As a result of my condition, I was not
sympathetic and after twenty five days, I asked the Vietnamese to
move him to a cage with Sergeant Wallingford Ed's weaknesses were not
abnormal for some prisoners; but, the standards I set for myself and
others did not allow me to be sympathetic. I believe that if Ed had
remained confined with me, he would have performed in such a way that he
would not today be the "butt" of derogatory comment from fellow POWs.

Every day the Communists would bring a portable radio to the area of our
cages to provide us with English language propaganda broadcasts from Hanoi.
I cannot describe the anger I felt upon hearing fellow Americans giving
aid and comfort to my enemy. Those making propaganda ranged from Jane
Fonda, Cora Weiss, and Ramsey Clark to POWs in Hanoi. I memorized
the names of POWs making these propaganda broadcasts. I was confident
that they would be dealt with under Article 104, the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ). I have heard various explanations from some
of these former POWs. Their reasons ranged from "torture", which I
accept; to various other explanations such as "I just wanted to
get my name out," "I felt survival was the most important mission,"
and "No one believed the propaganda anyway." I do not accept these other
explanations. They are at best self serving and a coward's excuse
when compared to the actions of those who held out under torture,
deprivation, and even death.

During the late Summer, 1972, an incident occurred which was not
understood by me and the others at the time, I was taken to a political
meeting with the camp Commander. I was asked if I would agree non
to escape. I demurred and explained that it was every soldiers duty to
escape. After the meeting, I was taken alone to bathe. This had
never happened before. Halfway down the trail to the little well, I was
told to go on alone. I did so. When I reached the well, I continued on
past it. About ten meters past the well, Vietnamese soldiers stood up all
around me. I immediately returned to the well and bathed. Upon my return to
my cage, an announcement was made by the camp Commander. He
announced that special privileges planned for us were now denied. The
reason given was my "intention to escape". It was also announced
that I would be punished. I was then ordered to gather my things and move
to a small open hut. When I arrived at the hut it became evident that
there was, inside the hut, a hole in the ground. I was ordered to enter
the hole. I refused. Other guards were summoned. We fought. I would
love to give a blow for blow account of this fight but there were not many
thrown by me. The bottom line is that I was unceremoniously thrown
into the hole and I was to remain there for months. The next morning it
became clear that the whole issue of privileges, my 'intention to escape,
and the subsequent incarceration in the hole was all a charade. The
NVA simply wanted my cage for another prisoner. Simply moving me
would have been to logical. The Communists always have to have a
reason for doing something, even if they have to invent it. Air Force
Captain David Baker was brought to the camp that next morning. Although
Dave Baker was wounded, he acquitted himself very well in prison. During
his entire period of captivity he could barely walk. Further, he was in
continuous pain and had a torn artery in his leg which could have ruptured
at any time. Had the artery ruptured, he would have died in a moment.
For days at a time, Dave Baker could not sleep. During this period,
there were several younger guards assigned to the camp. They often
smoked marijuana late at night. I know because I could smell the
marijuana smoke. On a few occasions, when I heard Dave tossing and
turning, I asked these guards to give him a marijuana cigarette. I do not
know if they actually did so. If they did, I am the one responsible for
it. I wrestled, in my mind, for years with this issue and others. I
have never used drugs of any kind myself. I have never tolerated
drug use in others. There are many soldiers who did time in prison
because of my total intolerance to drug abuse.

When I was being debriefed by DIA personnel, at Letterman Army
Medical Center, I was asked about drug use in the POW camp.

The inference was that "someone" had stated that some prisoners
smoked marijuana. I laid it out to the DIA exactly as stated in the above
paragraph. I believe it was Ed Carlson who brought up the subject of
marijuana in retaliation for statements made by Captain Baker
regarding Carlson's performance. There are two sides of this; on the
one hand "if" Baker was given marijuana, I asked that it be given to him
and I take full responsibility for my decision. The other side of this
issue is that much that has been said about Carlson are "cheap shots". How
men who suffered together could fall to these petty lows is beyond
me as a professional soldier. I made no accommodations with my
enemy. There may be others, from this group, who will say the same thing
although I doabt any would do so in my presence.

The SRO in a POW camp is required to makze rational decisions in an
irrational environment. I stand, four square, behind all decisions that
I made. I prayed for these men. I cajoled these men. At times I was
brutal in my coments to these men. I left this camp loving, if not
respecting, all these men. I believe that I never reached the
"survivor" level in prison. I was the same soldier I had always been.
I don't believe others can say the same.

The last POW brought to-our camp was U.S. Marine Captain James
Walsh. He was shot down over Quan Loi and had received head and
neck injuries when he ejected from his A-6 Intruder aircraft. He
did well in prison. He was also the source of news from home.

In the fall of 1972 air strikes pounded our area twenty four hours a
day. It became evident to me then that the U.S. Government knew
exactly where we were located. This was pretty much confirmed by a
USAF FAC at the height of the Christmas bombing campaign. He
had a Vietnamese on board who was broadcasting a message to the NVA
telling them that the war was almost over. He then flew over the camp
itself and played a Christmas carol. All of this occurring while
B-B2 bombing strikes fell all around. I later asked the DIA and
others to confirm what I believed to be true regarding U.S.
Government knowledge concerning the location of our camp. The DIA demurred
in answering. No one wanted to admit that they knew where we were located.

In October 1972, General Tra came to our camp specifically to interview
me in front of the other prisoners. I believe his desire to interview
me stemmed from my knowledge of the release in Hanoi of two U.S. pilots
who had made propaganda statements. The idea being that I would now
be ready to collaborate in exchange for release. As I had heard
both of these people speaking on the radio, thanking the NVA for its
humane treatment of POWs, I had no desire to become a part of this stunt
for the "anti-war" element. When I was asked what I would say upon being
released from prison, I said I would tell the truth. I
reiterated that shortly before this meeting, I had been chained in a hole
in the ground. I stated I still supported my country's objectives in
Vietnam. General Tra acknowledged my reply by terminating the
meeting; and I was dispatched back to a cage. Major Ed Carlson, at
this time, asked for a chance to meet the Commander. His request was
turned down. No one left our prison early. We all came home
together. DIA is well aware of the incident related above. The
political officer in attendance at the General Tra interview with me later
defected to France and was subsequently allowed to enter the United
States. The DIA usually refer to him as the "Mortician," giving rise to
a belief that he only dealt with "bones". This officer also dealt with
living POW's, to include those not returned at the end of the war. He
is the NVA officer who handled our release upon our arrival at Loc
Ninh, RVN, 12 Feb 2973. We were moved to a new camp shortly before
our release. I was allowed to live with George Wanat at the new
camp. I talked non-stop for days on end. For propaganda purposes, shortly
before our release, we had been allowed to have Christmas dinner together
in the old camp. The dinner was filmed by the NVA. I ruined the film by
requiring all to stand and pray. One must understand the atheism
of the Communists to understand why they became so abusive about
it. They desired a film record of us thanking them for the meal. We
thanked God instead.

After the announcement of the Paris Peace Agreement in January
1973, a new problem arose for me. We were fed very well by POW camp
standards and we were allowed to bathe regularly. As a result, we all
began to regain physical and mental strength. These new conditions of
our captivity provided some personnel, who had not previously stood up
to our captors, a new found sense of confidence which was manifested in
childish demands for more of such items as cigarettes and peanut candy.
Even Ed Carlson found the confidence to "demand" more peanut candy.
This basically ceased when I commented that it was rather childish to now
make demands upon our captors; since, when some of us were literally
starving, they did not see fit to demand anything. Their previous
lack of action stemmed primarily from a fear that their current rations
would be cut if they objected to anyone's treatment. I spent my entire
time in prison at the end of the food line. No matter where I lived in
the camp, the food line ended at my cage. I watched others throw
food away; never attempting to pass it to me. Yet, when I was too
sick to eat, these same people would come to my cage and eat my rations.
If my comments at the end of captivity embarrassed some of the POWs who were
in the same camp as I, so be it.

On 10 February we were issued new clothes and moved to a spot in
the jungle where trucks awaited us. We were loaded on these trucks and
cautioned that many NVA soldiers wanted to kill us. This was pure bull:
The rank and file NVA soldier either waved or just stared in amazement
at our departure. They were just soldiers, like us.

We were taken to Loc Ninh and spent one night. The twenty POWs from
the other camp joined us in the rubber plantation. Only George Wanat
and I remained chained to the trees that night.

The next day we were joined with the others and after a delay,
released to the Americans. The NVA officer handling this was the
"Mortician" My final act of defiance was to steal my chain, my old
cloths, and my rice bowl. These items were donated to the Infantry
Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1973. My performance during the
battle of Loc Ninh and my performance in prison is not in question. That
I saw more in battle and in prison and was later able to report it is
due to my training. Others may report what they saw, it does not change
what I know and reported. If any American ran things in our prison, it was
me. If there is any debate on who the Vietnamese viewed as the
SRO, the "Mortician" can answer this question very quickly.

---

Use your Browser's BACK function to return to the PREVIOUS page

---